In this paper, we study Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games via the theory of backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals defined with the help of a doubly controlled backward stochastic differential equation. Our results extend former ones by Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [3] and are based on a backward stochastic differential equation approach.
Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Isaacs [11] , differential games and stochastic differential games have been investigated by many authors. Fleming and Souganidis [7] were the first to study zerosum stochastic differential games and obtained that the lower and the upper value functions of such games satisfy the dynamic programming principle and coincide under the Isaacs condition. Recently, basing on the ideas of Fleming and Souganidis [7] , Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [3] studied Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games, while Buckdahn and Li [4] generalized at one hand the results of Fleming and Souganidis [7] for stochastic differential games and simplified the approach considerably by using backward stochastic differential equations. We refer the reader to Fleming and Souganidis [7] and Friedman [8] for a description of earlier results. In the present paper we bring ideas of the both papers [3] and [4] together, in order to study Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals.
As concerns deterministic differential games, since the work of Kononenko [13] in the framework of positional stategies and Tolwinski, Haurie and Leitmann [19] in the framework of Friedman strategies, it is well known that deterministic nonzero-sum differential games admit Nash equilibrium payoffs. Recently, Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [3] generalized the above result to two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games and obtained an existence and a characterization for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games. On the other hand, since the works of Case [5] and Friedman [8] , Nash equilibrium payoffs should be the solution of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. Basing on these ideas, Bessoussan and Frehse [1] and Mannucci [15] generalized the above result to stochastic differential games using the existence of smooth enough solutions for a system of parabolic partial differential equations, while Hamadène, Lepeltier and Peng [9] , Hamadène [10] and Lepeltier, Wu and Yu [14] used a saddle point argument in the framework of backward stochastic differential equations. But both methods rely heavily on the assumption of the non degeneracy of diffusion coefficients.
In this paper, we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games. The generalization of earlier result by Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [3] concerns the following aspects: Firstly, our cost functionals are defined by controlled backward stochastic differential equations, and the admissible control processes depend on events occurring before the beginning of the stochastic differential game. Thus, our cost functionals are not necessarily deterministic. Secondly, since our cost functionals are nonlinear, we cannot apply the methods used in Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [3] . We make use of the notion of stochastic backward semigroups introduced by Peng [17] , and the theory of backward stochastic differential equations. Finally, each player has his own backward stochastic differential equation, controlled also by the adversary player, which defines his own cost functional.
Beyond the theoretical interest of this paper the result of the paper is also applicable in finance and economics. For instance, we can consider an application of our theoretical result to a problem arising in financial markets. Let the financial market consist of a risk-free asset and risky stocks and consider two investors (players) in this financial market. Both investors try to maximize their payoff functionals, which are, in general, different. To maximize them, they have to use investment strategies with delays. Indeed, although both investors react immediately to the financial market, the financial market is not so quick in reacting to the moves of both investors. The above described problem leads to a two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game. We can use our theoretical result to get an existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for this game.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some notations and preliminaries concerning backward stochastic differential equations, which we will need in what follows. In Section 3, we give the main results of this paper and their proofs, i.e., an existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games as well as their proofs.
Preliminaries
Let (Ω, F, P) be the classical Wiener space, i.e., for the given terminal time T > 0, we consider Ω = C 0 ([0, T ]; R d ) as the space of continuous functions h : [0, T ] → R d such that h(0) = 0, endowed with the supremum norm, and let P be the Wiener measure on the Borel σ-field B(Ω) over Ω, with respect to which the coordinate process B t (ω) = ω t , ω ∈ Ω, t ∈ [0, T ], is a ddimensional standard Brownian motion. We denote by N P the collection of all P-null sets in Ω and define the filtration F = {F t } t∈[0,T ] , which is generated by the coordinate process B and completed by all P-null sets:
where N P is the set of all P-null sets.
Let us introduce the following spaces, which will be needed in what follows.
•
We consider the BSDE with data (f, ξ) :
is progressively measurable. We make the following assumptions: (H1) (Lipschitz condition): There exists a positive constant L such that for all (t,
The following existence and uniqueness theorem was established by Pardoux and Peng [16] .
Lemma 2.1 Let the assumptions (H1) and (H2) hold. Then, for all ξ ∈ L 2 (Ω, F T , P; R), BSDE (2.1) has a unique solution
We recall the well-known comparison theorem for solutions of BSDEs, which has been established by El Karoui, Peng and Quenez [6] and Peng [17] .
(Ω, F T , P; R), and f 1 and f 2 satisfy (H1) and (H2). We denote by (Y 1 , Z 1 ) and (Y 2 , Z 2 ) the solutions of BSDEs with data (f 1 , ξ 1 ) and (f 2 , ξ 2 ), respectively, and we suppose that
, and in particular,
where
and L is the Lipschitz constant in (H1).
3 Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games
The objective of this section is to investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzerosum stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals. An existence theorem (Theorem 3.20) and a characterization theorem (Theorem 3.16) of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games are the main results of this section. Let U and V be two compact metric spaces. Here U is considered as the control state space of the first player, and V as that of the second one. The associated sets of admissible controls will be denoted by U and V, respectively. The set U is formed by all U -valued F-progressively measurable processes, and V is the set of all V -valued F-progressively measurable processes.
For given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, we consider the following control system
where t ∈ [0, T ] is regarded as the initial time, and ζ ∈ L 2 (Ω, F t , P; R n ) as the initial state. The mappings 
It is obvious that, under the above conditions, for any u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, the control system (3.1) has a unique strong solution {X t,ζ;u,v s , 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T }, and we also have the following estimates. 
Here the constant C p only depends on p, the Lipschitz constant and the linear growth of b and σ.
For given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, we consider the following BSDE:
where X t,ζ;u,v is introduced in equation (3.1) and
satisfy the following conditions:
It is by now standard that under the above assumptions equation (3.2) admits a unique solution
Moreover, in Buckdahn and Li [4] it was shown that the following holds:
We now introduce subspaces of admissible controls and give the definition of admissible strategies.
Definition 3.3
The space U t,T (resp. V t,T ) of admissible controls for Player I (resp., II) on the interval [t, T ] is defined as the space of all processes {u r } r∈[t,T ] (resp., {v r } r∈[t,T ] ), which are F-progressively measurable and take values in U (resp., V ). Definition 3.4 A nonanticipating strategy with delay (NAD strategy) for Player I is a measurable mapping α : V t,T → U t,T , which satisfies the following properties: 1) α is a nonanticipative strategy, i.e., for every F-stopping time τ : Ω → [t, T ], and for
2) α is a nonanticipative strategy with delay, i.e., for all v ∈ V t,T , there exists an increasing sequence of stopping times {S n (v)} n≥1 with
The set of all NAD strategies for Player I for games over the time interval [t, T ] is denoted by A t,T . The set of all NAD strategies β : U t,T → V t,T for Player II for games over the time interval [t, T ] is defined symmetrically and denoted by B t,T .
We have the following lemma, which is useful in what follows.
Lemma 3.5 Let α ∈ A t,T and β ∈ B t,T . Then there exists a unique couple of admissible control
Such a result can be found already in [3] . However, since our definition of NAD strategies differs, we shall provide its proof.
For given control processes u(·) ∈ U t,T and v(·) ∈ V t,T , we introduce now the associated cost functional
(Recall that Y t,x;u,v is defined by BSDE (3.2) with ζ = x ∈ R n ). We define the lower and the upper value functions W and U , resp., of the game: For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , we put
and
Here we use Lemma 3.5 to identify (X t,x;α,β , Y t,x;α,β , Z t,x;α,β ) = (X t,x;u,v , Y t,x;u,v , Z t,x;u,v ), and, in particular, J(t, x; α, β) = J(t, x; u, v), where (u, v) ∈ U t,T × V t,T is the couple of controls associated with (α, β) ∈ A t,T × B t,T by the relation (α(v), β(u)) = (u, v).
Remark 3.6 For the convenience of the reader we recall the notion of the essential infimum and the essential supremum of families of random variables (see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve [12] for more details). Given a family of F-measurable real valued random variables ξ α (α ∈ I), an F-measurable random variable ξ is said to be essinf α∈I ξ α , if (i) ξ ≤ ξ α , P − a.s., for all α ∈ I;
(ii) if for any random variable η such that η ≤ ξ α , P-a.s., for all α ∈ I, it holds that η ≤ ξ, P-a.s.
We introduce notion of esssup α∈I ξ α by the following relation:
Remark 3.7 Lemma 3.5 guarantees that for NAD strategies α ∈ A t,T and β ∈ B t,T there exists a unique associate couple (u, v) ∈ U t,T × V t,T of admissible controls such that α(v) = u, β(u) = v.
For general nonanticipative strategies we can, in general, not get such a couple of controls. Let us give an example: We suppose that U = V and ϕ, ψ : U → U are measurable functions such that ψ • ϕ doesn't have a fixed point. We define
Then α and β are nonanticipative strategies for Player I and II, respectively. But there is no
But this means that v s is a fixed point of ψ •ϕ, which contradicts the assumptions of the absence of fixed points.
Let us now give the proof of Lemma 3.5.
Proof:
We give the proof in two steps.
Step 1: For (u, v) ∈ U t,T × V t,T we denote by {S n (v)} n≥1 (resp. {T n (u)} n≥1 ) the sequence of stopping times associated with α ∈ A t,T (resp. β ∈ B t,T ) by Definition 3.4. Then, for arbitrarily given (u, v) ∈ U t,T × V t,T we define the optional set
and we observe that Γ(ω) is a finite set. We denote by D Γ the first hitting time of Γ, and we define a sequence of {F r }-stopping times as follows:
. . .
Recall that a ∧ b = min{a, b}, a, b ∈ R. We notice that τ 1 (u, v) is independent of (u, v), and for n ≥ 2,
. Indeed, this is a direct consequence of point 2) in Definition 3.4 and the definition of {τ n (u, v)} n≥1 .
From the definition of {τ n } n≥1 it follows that, for all (u, v)
Step 2: For α ∈ A t,T and β ∈ B t,T , we let {τ n } n≥1 be constructed as above. Since neither τ 1 depends on the controls nor (α, β) restricted to [[t, τ 1 ]] does, the process
Taking into account that τ 2 only depends on the controls restricted to [[t,
and since we have (
Repeating the above argument we put
Then, since due to (n−1)th iteration step (α(v n−1 ),
, and, thus, also
from which we deduce the existence of the limit of stopping times
Obviously, (u, v) ∈ U t,T × V t,T , and since (u,
, n ≥ 0 (see the above property iii)). But this allows to conclude from ii) that
Consequently, since the above defined process (u, v) ∈ U t,T × V t,T has the property that
The proof is complete.
The following lemmas were established in [2] under a slightly different definition of NAD strategies. However, their validity in our new framework can be checked easily.
Lemma 3.8 Under assumptions (H3.1)-(H3.4), for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , the value functions W (t, x) and U (t, x) are deterministic functions.
Lemma 3.9 There exists a positive constant C such that, for all t, t ′ ∈ [0, T ] and x, x ′ ∈ R n , we have 
The same properties hold true for the function U .
Remark 3.10 From the above Lemma it follows, in particular, that the functions W and U are of at most linear growth, i.e., there exists a positive constant C such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ] and
We now recall the notion of stochastic backward semigroups, which was introduced by Peng [17] and translated by Buckdahn and Li [4] into the framework of stochastic differential games. For a given initial condition (t, x), a positive number δ ≤ T − t, for admissible control processes u(·) ∈ U t,t+δ and v(·) ∈ V t,t+δ , and a real-valued random variable η ∈ L 2 (Ω, F t+δ , P; R), we define G 
and X t,x;u,v is the unique solution of equation (3.1) with ζ = x ∈ R n . We observe that for the solution Y t,x;u,v of BSDE (3.2) with ζ = x ∈ R n we have
Remark 3.11 For the special case that f is independent of (y, z) we have
In particular,
For more details on stochastic backward semigroups the reader is referred to Peng [17] and Buckdahn and Li [4] . Let us also recall the following dynamic programming principle for the value functions of stochastic differential games. Its proof can be found in [2] .
After having recalled some basics on two-player zero-sum stochastic differential games, let us introduce the framework of two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games where each of the both players has his own terminal as well as running cost functionals Φ j and f j , respectively, j = 1, 2. More precisely, for arbitrarily given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, we consider the following BSDEs, j = 1, 2,
where X t,ζ;u,v is introduced by equation (3.1) and
are assumed to satisfy the conditions (H3.3) and (H3.4). In addition, in order to simplify the arguments, we also suppose that (H3.5) Φ j and f j , j = 1, 2, are bounded. The associated stochastic backward semigroups are denoted by j G t,x;u,v t,s , t ≤ s ≤ T, j = 1, 2, and for the associated cost functionals J j (t, x; u, v) = j Y t,x;u,v t , we have
For what follows we assume that the Isaacs condition holds in the following sense: For all (t, x, y, p) ∈ [0, T ] × R n × R × R n and A ∈ S n (Recall that S n denotes the set of n × n symmetric matrices) and for j = 1, 2, we have
Under the Isaacs condition (3.3) we have, similar to [2] ,
Finally, we complete the preparation with the definition of the Nash equilibrium payoff of stochastic differential games, which is similar to the definition introduced by Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [3] . Definition 3.13 A couple (e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ R 2 is called a Nash equilibrium payoff at the point (t, x) if for any ε > 0, there exists (α ε , β ε ) ∈ A t,T × B t,T such that, for all (α, β) ∈ A t,T × B t,T , 5) and
Remark 3.14 We attract the reader's attention to the fact that J j (t, x; α, β), j = 1, 2, are random variables. In our existence result (Theorem 3.20) we will construct cost functionals J j (t, x; α ε , β ε ), ε > 0, j = 1, 2, which are deterministic.
By virtue of Lemma 3.5 we can easily get the following lemma.
Lemma 3.15 For any ε > 0 and (α ε , β ε ) ∈ A t,T × B t,T , (3.5) holds if and only if, for all (u, v) ∈ U t,T × V t,T ,
We now give the characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games. Under Isaacs condition (3.3) , (e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ R 2 is a Nash equilibrium payoff at point (t, x) if and only if for all ε > 0, there exist (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T such that for all s ∈ [t, T ] and j = 1, 2,
Remark 3.17 The above Theorem generalizes the results of [3] and [18] from the case of classical cost functionals without running costs to nonlinear cost functionals which running cost f j , j = 1, 2, depend on (y, z). Moreover, in our framework the controls can depend on events occurring before time t.
We prepare the proof of this Theorem by the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.18 Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n and u ∈ U t,T be arbitrarily fixed. Then, (i) for all δ ∈ [0, T − t] and ε > 0, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ A t,T such that, for all v ∈ V t,T ,
(ii) for all δ ∈ [0, T − t] and ε > 0, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ A t,T such that, for all v ∈ V t,T ,
Proof: We only give the proof of (i). Indeed, (ii) can be proved by a symmetric argument. We begin with observing that putting β v ′ (u ′ ) = v ′ , for all u ′ ∈ U t+δ,T , defines for every v ′ ∈ V t+δ,T an element β v ′ ∈ B t+δ,T and allows to regard V t+δ,T as a subset of B t+δ,T . Consequently, from (3.4), for any y ∈ R n , we have
Therefore, for ε 0 > 0, there exists α y ∈ A t+δ,T such that
(The existence of α y ∈ A t+δ,T can be shown with the techniques used in the proof of Lemma 3.8 in Buckdahn and Li [4] ).
(3.10)
The such introduced mapping α : V t,T → U t,T is an NAD strategy. Indeed, on {τ > t + δ}, P − a.s. Therefore, because of the nonanticipativity of α y i , i ≥ 1,
(ii) The mapping α is a nonanticipative strategy with delay. Proof:
Let {S i n (v 2 )} n≥1 be the sequence of the stopping times associated with α y i ∈ A t+δ,T in the sense of the Definition 3.4. Then, putting S 0 = t, S 1 = t + δ,
We have that {S n (v)} n≥1 satisfies the condition 2) in Definition 3.4. Thus, α is a nonanticipative strategy with delay. From Lemma 3.9, (3.9) and (3.10) it follows that, for v ∈ V t,T ,
Thus, from Proposition 3.2,
Here C is a constant which can vary from line to line, but which is independent of v ∈ V t,T . Putting ε 0 = εC −1 in the latter estimate, we obtain
The proof of Theorem 3.16 necessitates the following lemma. , P − a.s., it holds, for all real τ ∈ [t, T ],
This lemma is the result of a straight forward estimate using the fact that b and σ are bounded.
Let us give now the proof of Theorem 3.16.
Proof of Theorem 3.16: Sufficiency of (3.7) and (3.8).
Proof: Let ε > 0 be arbitrarily fixed. For ε 0 > 0 being specified later we suppose that (u ε 0 , v ε 0 ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T satisfies (3.7) and (3.8), i.e., for all s ∈ [t, T ] and j = 1, 2, 11) and
Let us fix some partition:
We apply Lemma 3.18 to u ε 0 and t + δ = t 1 , · · · , t m , successively. Then, for ε 1 > 0 (ε 1 depends on ε and is specified later) there exist NAD strategies α i ∈ A t,T , i = 1, · · · , m, such that, for all v ∈ V t,T ,
For all v ∈ V t,T , we define
where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure on the real line R. Obviously, S v and t v are stopping times, and we have
It is easy to check that α ε is an NAD strategy. From (3.13) it follows that
In what follows we will show that, for all ε > 0 and v ∈ V t,T ,
This relation as well as the symmetric one for J 1 will lead to the sufficiency of (3.7) and (3.8).
For the proof of (3.15), we note that by (3.14), Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3 there exists a positive constant C such that
Thanks to the Lemmas 3.9 and 3.19 as well as the definitions of t v and α ε we have
Thus, from Lemma 2.3 it follows that
and the above inequality and (3.16) yield
For s ∈ [t, T ], we put
By the inequality a ≤ b + |a − b|, a, b ∈ R, we have
Using Lemma 2.3 again as well as the boundedness of W 2 , we see that
where we have used (3.11) for the latter estimate. Observing that
we deduce from the Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 that
1 {t v =t i } and that, in analogy to (3.18)
we see that
0 .
In the frame of the proof of (3.15) we also need the following estimate
In order to verify this relation we let, for all s ∈ [t, t v ],
and we consider the BSDE solved by y = (y s )
as well as
We notice that
(Of course, these equalities, in particular, the latter one, are understood as dsdP − a.e.) Thanks to Lemma 2.3 we have
Therefore, we have
and (3.17), (3.18) as well as the above inequality yield
We can choose τ > 0, ε 0 > 0, and ε 1 > 0 such that Cε 0 + Cmε
2 ≤ ε and ε 0 < ε. Thus,
By a symmetric argument we can construct β ε ∈ B t,T such that, for all u ∈ U t,T ,
Finally, by virtue of (3.15), (3.19) , (3.12) and Lemma 3.15 we can see that (α ε , β ε ) satisfies Definition 3.13. Therefore, (e 1 , e 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium payoff.
Proof of Theorem 3.16: Necessity of (3.7) and (3.8).
Proof: We assume that (e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ R 2 is a Nash equilibrium payoff at the point (t, x). Then, for all sufficiently small ε > 0, there exists (α ε , β ε ) ∈ A t,T × B t,T such that, for all (α, β) ∈ A t,T × B t,T
Moreover, from Lemma 3.5 we know that there exists a unique couple (u ε , v ε ) such that
Let us argue by contradiction. For this we observe that (3.21) means that (3.8) holds. Assuming that (3.7) doesn't hold true, we have, for all ε ′ > 0, the existence of some ε ∈ (0, ε ′ ) (for which we use the notations introduced above) and δ ∈ [0, T − t] such that, for some j ∈ {1, 2}, say for j = 1,
By applying Lemma 3.18 to u ε and t + δ we see that, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ A t,T , such that, for all v ∈ V t,T ,
By virtue of Lemma 3.5 there exists a unique couple (u, v) ∈ U t,T × V t,T such that
We observe that this, in particular, means that u = u ε on [t, t + δ]. Let us define now a control u ∈ U t,T as follows:
Since β ε ∈ B t,T is nonanticipative it follows that β ε ( u) = β ε (u ε ) = v ε on [t, t + δ], and for all s ∈ [t + δ, T ],
Then we have
and standard arguments show that also
Therefore,
t,x; u,βε( u) t+δ
Thanks to Lemma 2.2 and (3.24) we have
Then, from the Lipschitz property of f 1 we see that |a r | ≤ L, |b r | ≤ L, r ∈ [t, t + δ], and BSDE (3.26) takes the following form:
By putting
applying Itô's formula to y s Q s , and then taking the conditional expectation, we deduce that
By the Schwarz inequality we have
We observe that
Then,
, where we use (3.22) in the last inequality. Combining (3.27) with
we have
and (3.25) then yields
We can choose ε ′ ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently small such that ε ′3 2 C 0 > ε ′4 (Recall that ε ′ > 0 has been introduced at the beginning of the proof, assuming that (3.7) doesn't hold true). Then this relation is also satisfied by ε ∈ (0, ε ′ ) : ε 3 2 C 0 > ε 4 . Since P(∆) > 0, the above inequality contradicts with (3.20) for α(·) = u. The proof is complete.
We now give the existence theorem of a Nash equilibrium payoff. Let us admit the following Proposition for the moment. We shall give its proof after.
Proposition 3.21
Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.16, for all ε > 0, there exists (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T independent of F t such that, for all t ≤ s 1 ≤ s 2 ≤ T , j = 1, 2,
Let us begin with the proof of Theorem 3.20.
Proof: By Theorem 3.16 we only have to prove that, for all ε > 0, there exists (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T which satisfies (3.7) and (3.8) for s ∈ [t, T ], j = 1, 2.
For ε > 0, we consider (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T given by Proposition 3.21, i.e., in particular, (u ε , v ε ) is independent of F t , and we put s 1 = s, s 2 = T in Proposition 3.21. This yields (3.7). We also observe that the fact that (u ε , v ε ) is independent of F t implies that J j (t, x; u ε , v ε ), j = 1, 2, are deterministic and (J 1 (t, x; u ε , v ε ), J 2 (t, x; u ε , v ε )), ε > 0 is a bounded sequence. Consequently, we can choose an accumulation point of this sequence, as ε → 0. Let us denote this point by (e 1 , e 2 ). Obviously, this combined with (3.7) allows to conclude from Theorem 3.16 that (e 1 , e 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium payoff at (t, x). We also refer to the fact that since (u ε , v ε ) is independent of F t , the conditional probability P(·|F t ) of the event W j (s 1 , X )] is independent of F t . The proof is complete.
Before we present the proof of the above Proposition, we give the following Lemmas, which will be needed.
Lemma 3.22
For all ε > 0, and all δ ∈ [0, T − t] and x ∈ R n , there exists (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T independent of F t , such that and augmented by the P-null sets. By U t s,T (resp., V t s,T ) we denote the set of F t -adapted processes {u r } r∈[s,T ] (resp., {v r } r∈[s,T ] ) taking their values in U (resp., V ). Moreover, let A t s,T (resp., B t s,T ) denote the set of NAD strategies which map from V t s,T into U t s,T (resp. U t s,T into V t s,T ). With this setting we replace the framework of SDEs driven by a Brownian motion B = (B s ) s∈[0,T ] by that of SDEs driven by a Brownian motion (B s − B t ) s∈[t,T ] . We also translate the above arguments from the framework of SDEs to the associated BSDEs. Then, proceeding in the same manner as above, but now in our new framework, we have the Isaacs condition, for j = 1, 2, s ∈ [t, T ], From the dynamic programming principle for W j and by observing that V t t,T ⊂ B t t,T we have The symmetric argument allows to show that the existence of β ε ∈ B t t,T such that, for all u ∈ U t t,T ,
t,x;u,βε(u) t,t+δ
[W 2 (t + δ, X t,x;u,βε(u) t+δ )], P − a.s.
In the same way as shown in Lemma 3.5, we get the existence of (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t t,T × V t t,T such that
Therefore, we have 
